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DICKINSON LAI

REVIEW

CURRENT TAX DEVELOPMENTS*
By
'
Edward N. Polisher .1.

1. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Income Tax Law was first enacted by Congress in 1914, the
Estate Tax in 1916 and the present Gift Tax in 1932. As a system of jurisprudence,
Federal taxation is thus a matter of recent origin when compared with the venerability of the common law, the civil law and other established legal codes.
The Federal tax pattern is in a fluid and formative state. Its development
is being shaped and constantly changed by the Congress, the Courts and the Treasury Department through its regulations and rulings. The cumulative actions of these
agencies during any year affect deeply the course of development and the incidence
of Federal taxation. During the past year, however, the velocity of change has been
accelerated. As a result, it has. been a period of significant and extraordinary changes
in the law of Federal taxation. The Congress, the Courts and the Treasury Department have each made their contribution to these developments.
II.

INCOME TAX DEVELOPMENTS
a, Revenue Act of 1948

The 1948 Revenue Act was enacted by Congress over Presidential veto on
April 2, 1948. Its outstanding income tax feature was the adoption of the split
income technique in the taxation of the income of married persons. Prior to its
passage, husbands and wives residing in community property states enjoyed a distinct income tax advantage over those resident in common law states. In community
property states, the income of either spouse during coverture was considered to
have been earned by both and was therefore divisible between them for income
tax purposes. Since the surtax rates under Federal Income Tax law are progressive,
the income, when divided between husband and wife and taxed separately, onehalf to each of them, resulted in less income tax than in a common law state where
the entire income was taxable solely to the spouse who earned it. To eliminate
* This paper was delivered before the Eleventh Annual Institute on Accounting held in connection with the 75th Anniversary of the Ohio State University on May 21, 1949 at Columbus,
Ohio.
*4 LL.B. Dickinson, 1922; Member of the Philadelphia Bar; Lecturer on Taxation, Dickinson Law School; Author "Estate Planning and Estate Tax Saving" (Second edition, 1948).
The author gratefully acknowleges the assistance of his associate, Harry Yohlin, Esquire, in
the preparation of this article.
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this discrimination, which was based upon the mere fortuitous, geographical residence of the taxpayer, and to equalize the burden of Federal income taxation among
all the residents of these United States, the 1948 Revenue Act allowed all husbands and wives, wherever resident, to divide their combined incomes. It should
be noted, however, that the splitting of income for tax purposes does not create
any new property rights in the non-earning spouse to that part of the income attributable to such spouse. Regulations governing the filing of joint returns under
the new act have been promulgated and now appear in Reg. 111, Sec. 29. 51-1 (b).
b. Supreme Court Decisions
1. Forgiveness of Indebtedness
There have been a number of significant decisions by the Supreme Court
of the United States during the current session. In Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336
U. S. 28 (1949), the Court severely revised and restricted the test for the taxability of income resulting from a reduction of indebtedness. A proper understanding of the implications of this decision calls for a spot of background.
In 1931, the Supreme Court decided, in United States v. Kirby Lumber Co.,
284 U. S. 1, that open market purchases of its own bonds by a solvent corporate
taxpayer for less than the amount due resulted in the realization of income.
In Helvering v. American Dental Co., 318 U. S. 322 (1943), the Court
significantly modified the scope of the Kirby decision. There, a corporate taxpayer,
presumably solvent, compromised its liabilities for unpaid rent and interest on
notes for less than the amount owing, as a result of direct negotiations with its
creditors. The Court held that no income was realized by the debtor by this reduction of its indebtedness.
Extending the rationale of these decisions, the test subsequently developed
by the lower courts to determine whether taxable income was realized from the
acquisition by the debtor of its bonds or other evidences of indebtedness for less
than their due amount was: (a) whether the purchase had been made in an open
market-that is, through brokers-in which event taxable gain was realized; or
(b) whether the purchase had been made by the debtor as a result of direct negotiations with the creditor, in which event no taxable gain would result.
The Jacobson case involved both such situations. The taxpayer, in straitened
financial circumstances but solvent, repurchased at various times some of his
personal bonds for less than the amounts due thereon. In some instances, the
taxpayer purchased the bonds from the owners directly; in others, the acquisitions
were made through a bondholders committee, or through a broker. In either case,
however, the bondholder knew that the taxpayer was the purchaser.
The Tax Court, following the theory of the Kirby and the American Dental
Co. decisions, held that in respect of the bonds purchased directly by the taxpayer,
no taxable income resulted; but, as to the bonds purchased through agents, taxable
income was realized.
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In its opinion, the Supreme Court eliminated this distinction and severely
limited the principle which many had believed was implicit in the American Dental
Co. decision. It held that in either event, taxable income was realized because the
transactions were all sales by which each bondholder sold his entire interest in
the bond for the best price obtainable; that there was no intention to transfer part
of the claims for cash and to make a gift to the debtor of the balance, which
had been found to be the fact in the American Dental Co. case.
The test now seems to be whether there was a specific intent on the part of
the creditors to "sell" a portion of the claim for cash and 'to forgive the balance
gratuitiously. The transaction must not have the effect of a sale at the highest
price available. The further application of the American Dental Co. case, if any,
must be limited to open account indebtedness, and claims for rent or interest, in
contrast to bond issues.
When bonds are purchased by the debtor for less than face value, when
is income realized? Another recent decision held that income was realized upon
the purchase of the bonds, even though the bonds remain uncancelled for a long
period because of a valid business reason: Commissioner v. Pittsburgh & West
(CCA-3, 1949).
F. (2d) Virginia Railway Co., 2.

The Sansome Rule

In another decision, the Supreme Court modified the doctrine of Commissionerv. Sansome, 60 F. (2d) 931 (CCA-2, 1932), cert. den. 287 U. S. 667 (1933).
The Sansome rule, as it has become popularly known, was intended to cope with
the following situation. A corporation with a substantial surplus of undistributed
earnings sought to avoid the distribution of such earnings in the form of taxable
dividends. A tax-free reorganization was arranged under which its entire assets,
subject to liabilities, would be transferred to a new corporation in exchange for
its stock. The successor corporation thereafter would distribute to its stockholders
the accumulated funds acquired by it from its predecessor. Since this property was
received in exchange for stock, it was contended that it was capital in nature and,
therefore, not taxable income. The Circuit Court held, however, that the accumulated earnings of the predecessor became earnings of the successor corporation
in a tax-free reorganization; and that a distribution of such earnings resulted
in a taxable dividend.
The Sansome rule seemed to be based upon the fact that there was a continuity of the business venture. If this were correct, the converse would also be true.
Thus, if a predecessor corporation had a deficit, such deficit could be used to reduce the successor corporation's earned surplus. The Supreme Court has rejected this corollary.
69 S. Ct. 617 (1949), the
U. S. -,
In Commissioner v. Phipps, for distribution, by
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after, distributions were made to stockholders which were treated as capital distributions. The issue was whether the deficits of the subsidiaries could be used
to reduce the surplus from accumulated earnings of the parent. The Court held
that they did not. The distribution to stockholders of the earnings attributable
to the parent corporation were taxed as dividends. The rationale of the decision
was that this was a rule necessary to prevent tax avoidance of corporate earnings
of the distributing corporation.
In its opinion, the Court did indicate a solution to the problem. It consists of
reversing the technique. Instead of merging the deficit-corporation into the
surplus-corporation, the latter should be merged into the former. The deficit-corporation must be the survivor. See Harter v. Helvering, 79 F. (2d) 12 (CCA-2, 1935).
This merger procedure reduces just as effectively the earnings of the surplus
corporation.
Allocation of Income Between Parent and Subsidiary Corporations
In another decision, the Supreme Court held that wholly owned subsidiaries,
by agreement, cannot allocate their income to the parent for tax purposes.
(1949),
U. S. In National Carbide Corporationv. Commissioner, the parent corporation organized several subsidiaries. These were operated under
a contract with the parent whereby the subsidiaries paid to the parent all profits
in excess of 6% on their outstanding capital stock which was nominal in amount.
The subsidiaries were held taxable not only on the 6% retained, but also on the
profits turned over to the parent. The Court stated that although a corporation
which engages in "business activity" is not taxable on income which it collects
as "agent" for its owner, the subsidiaries under the facts were not in this category.
3.

c. Lower Court Decisions
The recent lower court decisions in the income tax field are numerous. We
have chosen only those decisions which are of the widest interest.
1. Partial Liquidations
When is a partial liquidation of a corporation deemed equivalent to the
distribution of a taxable dividend under Section 115 (g) of the Code? This has
long troubled taxpayers and courts alike. The rule seems to be that where the
partial liquidation is prompted by a valid business purpose, it will not be considered a dividend. However, the application of this test has been indefinite. The
Tax Court recently furnished an example of a valid business purpose. In Joseph
w. Imler, 11 TC-No. 101 (1948) (acq.), a corporation with earned surplus
was forced to abandon some of its activities as a result of a fire. It used the insurance proceeds to redeem a part of its stock. This distribution was held not to
be a dividend because it resulted from a bona fide contraction of business operations and consequent reduction in the capital employed.
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Section 115 (g) of the Code received another interpretation by the Tax
Court. This section deals with the treatment of distributions by a corporation which
are considered equivalent to a dividend. The Estate of Rodman Wanamaker owned all of the stock of John Wanamaker Philadelphia, a corporation, which in
turn owned all of the stock of John Wanamaker New York. Both corporations
had large earned surpluses. The estate required funds to pay its debts. It could
have obtained these funds by having John Wanamaker Philadelphia distribute
its earnings as dividends or by redemption of a portion of its shares. This, however, would have resulted in a substantial income tax. Instead, the estate sold some
of its John Wanamaker Philadelphia stock to John Wanamaker New York. The
Commissioner sought to apply Sec. 115 (g). The Court decided that a redemption
of stock to be classified as a taxable dividend must involve repurchase of a corporation's own stock. Here, however John Wanamaker New York did not purchase
its own stock, but that of the parent corporation. Therefore Sec. 115 (g) did not
apply: Trustees Common Stock John WVanamaker Philadelphia,et al., 11 TC 365
(1948), appealed to CCA-3.
Thus, the estate got the money it needed and still owned all of the stock
through the parent corporation. This may be an additional reason for operating
a business in multi-corporate form.
Sale of Corporate Assets
Who pays the tax on the gain realized from the sale of corporate assets after
liquidation, has been a constant source of litigation in recent years. Where a corporation sells its assets at a profit and then is liquidated, a double tax results;
first to the corporation on the gain from the sale and second to the stockholders
on the gain over the basis for their stock. Attempts to avoid this double tax have
taken two forms. In one, the corporation is first liquidated and then the stockholders sell the assets; in the other, the stock is sold and the buyer then liquidates
the corporation.
In the Court Holding Co. case, 324 U. S. 331 (1945), the Supreme Court
cast considerable doubt on the effectiveness of the first technique. It held that
where a coporation is liquidated and the sale of the assets received by the stockholders in liquidation follows soon thereafter, the transaction will be subject to
close scrutiny. If the negotiations for sale of the corporate assets were'commenced
prior to the liquidation, gain resulting from the sale will be imputed to and taxed
to the corporation. The taxpayer must show that no negotiations took place on
behalf of the corporation for the sale of the property prior to liquidation, if the
tax to the corporation is to be eliminated.
2.

Two recent Tax Court decisions indicate exceptions to this rule. In Steubenville Bridge Company, II TC-No. 96 (1948), a syndicate, none of whose members was a stockholder, arranged to acquire options to purchase all the stock of
a corporation whose chief asset was a bridge. The syndicate then entered into

228
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a contract to sell the bridge to the State of West Virginia. Thereafter, it secured
the options, exercised them, liquidated the corporation and then consumated the
sale. The Court held no gain was realized by the corporation because the negotiations for the sale of the bridge were not conducted by the corporation but by
the members of the syndicate who were not then stockholders of the corporation.
The court also stressed the fact that the original stockholders were not aware,
at the time they assigned their stock to the syndicate, of the contemplated sale of
the bridge; and further indicated that if the negotiations for a sale by the stockholders commence after steps toward liquidation have been taken, the corporation
will not be considered as the seller.
An exception even closer to the line results from the decision in Dalldu Downtown Development Co., 12 TC-No. 17 (1949). A, a corporation, negotiated with
B, a corporation, for the purchase of the building where A conducted its banking
business. The acquisition of this property by direct purchase would require an
investment in excess of the limit permitted A by Texas law. The officers of A,
therefore, formed a dummy corporation which purchased all of B's stock at the
price agreed upon for the building, liquidated B, created a mortgage on the building, and then conveyed the property to A, subject to such mortgage. The court
held that B corporation realized no taxable gain from the disposition of the building. It is apparently immaterial that the negotiations were for the sale of assets
and that the stock was purchased for the purpose of acquiring these assets by an
immediate liquidation of the corporation.
Both these decisions seem inconsistent with the realistic approach of the
Court HoldingCo., supra, and their fate on appeal should be watched with interest.
3.

Stockholder Advances to Corporations
Where a taxpayer advances money to a corporation which later becomes defunct, two questions usually arise with respect to the taxpayer's deduction for such
loss. The first, whether the advance was an additional capital contribution or a
debt; the second, if it is a debt, was it a business or a non-business bad debt.
If the advance is deemed a capital contribution, the deduction is limited to a longterm capital loss under sections 23 (g) and 117 (b) of the Code. On the other
hand, should it be construed a debt, it may be a non-business bad debt, in which
case the deduction will be treated as is a short-term capital loss (Section 23 (k)
(4) of the Code); or it may be a business bad debt, so that the deduction would
be allowed in full (Section 23 (k) (1) of the Code).
Whether an advance is a debt or a capital contribution is a problem which
arises most often where a stockholder lends money to a controlled corporation.
The Commissioner and the Tax Court generally have considered such loans as
capital contributions on the theory that there was no intention to create a debt.
In the recent case of O'Neill v. Commissioner, 170 F. (2d) 596 (CCA-2,
1948)

cert. den.

-

U. S.

-

(1949),

the Circuit Court differed with
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this approach, although it affirmed the Tax Court's decision. The controlling factor, the Court held, was whether the corporation served a valid business purpose.
If so, the dealings between the taxpayer and the corporation should be viewed
in the same light as though he did not own or control the corporation. Here,
however, the court pointed out the only disclosed reason for creating the corporation was to make it unnecessary for the taxpayer to procure his wife's signature
to deeds. This was considered too trivial a reason to constitute a valid business
purpose.
The importance of the case rests on the new approach recommended by the
Circuit Court where advances are made by stockholders to controlled corporations
which have a valid business purpose.
Whether the debt is a business or non-business bad debt has been before the
courts in two recent cases: Valentine E. Macy, Jr., 8 TCM 45 (1949) and Maloney
- (CCA-9, 1949).
F. (2d)
et al v. Spencer, In the Macy case, the finding of a business bad debt was predicated on the
taxpayer's promotional activities. The court found that the taxpayer maintained
a separate office through which he looked after his interests in numerous and
varied enterprises, including real estate, publishing, coal, cotton, railroads, petroleum, etc.
In the Spencer case, the court found that the taxpayer, who was the sole
stockholder in three corporations, organized to carry on fruit and vegetable packing and canning, was engaged in the business of acquiring and leasing food processing plants and that the loss was a proximate incident of the leasing.
Unreasonable Accumulation of Surplus
The Tax Court recently handed down a liberal decision which has been &cquiesced in by the Commissioner in respect of the application of Section 102 of
the Code which imposes a penalty on corporations for unreasonable accumulation
of surplus.
In the /. L. Goodman Furniture Co., 11 TC 530 (1949), (acq.), the stock
of a retail furniture store was owned 90% by a family group and 10% by other
stockholders. The company had cash, government obligations and other securities
of approximately $920,000.00. The company's average yearly earnings amounted
to $125,000.00 and annual dividends were paid in the sum of $36,000.00. Since
1935, the company had planned to open one or two additional branches, which
the president personally estimated would cost $500,000.00, but the threat of war
and later the war itself, prevented such expansion. No other evidence, such as
building estimates, etc., was introduced. Land for this purpose was not acquired
until 1947. The Tax Court, nevertheless, held that the earnings were being reasonably accumulated for business purposes.
It is yet too early to determine whether this decision indicates a more liberal
approach by the Tax Court to Section 102 problems. In the past, the courts have
4.
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generally refused to place much weight on nebulous plans for expansion, unless
the taxpayer could show specific steps taken in that direction and cost estimates
based on something more than the mere opinion of the corporate officers.
Reasonable Compensation
The abrogation of the Dobson rule by Congress has afforded taxpayers another opportunity for relief in unreasonable compensation cases. The presumption
of correctness, which surrounds the Commissioner's determination, imposes on
the taxpayer the burden to produce evidence supporting the reasonableness of
the salaries involved. As a practical matter, what the Tax Court has been doing
is to act as a sort of arbitrator and to fix reasonable compensation usually at a
figure somewhere between the salary determined by the Commissioner and that
contended for by the taxpayer. So long as the Tax Court's finding had a reasonable basis' in fact, the Circuit Courts felt themselves foreclosed by the Dobson
rule from reviewing such decisions. In several recent cases, however, the Circuit
Courts have adopted a more positive attitude.
In The Roth Office Equipment Company v. Gallagher, 172 F. (2d) 452
(CCA-6, 1949), the total salaries paid to four officers amounted to $74,000.00.
The Commissioner allowed $41,000.00 and the Tax Court set the salaries at
$61,000.00.
In Wright-Bernet, Inc. v. Commissioner, 172 F. (2d) 343, (CCA-6, 1949),
the officers received $86,000.00 in salaries. The Commissioner allowed $51,000.00
and the District Court $68,000.00.
In both cases, the taxpayers introduced evidence that the salaries paid were
comparable to those paid to similar employees throughout the industry. The Commissioner submitted no evidence to refute the reasonableness of salaries paid.
The Sixth Circuit reversed both lower courts and allowed the salaries in
full. It held that the lower courts cannot reduce the amount of salaries actually paid
where qualified witnesses testify to their reasonableness and such evidence is not
contradicted by the Commissioner.
Ordinarily, where the Commissioner disallows part of the compensation paid
to officers, the corporation gets no deduction for the portion disallowed, but the
recipient of the salary nevertheless pays tax on the full amount as income. A
recent case indicates one way to avoid this double tax. In Willis W. Clark, 11
TC 672 (1948) (non-acq.) appealed to CCA-6 (2/28/49), the corporation entered into an agreement with its president prior to the close of the taxable year 1942,
limiting his salary and bonus for the year 1941, to the amount which would be
allowed by the Commissioner as a deduction to the corporation. The officer gave
the corporation his promissory note for the difference between .the amount agreed
upon between the Revenue Agent and the corporation as reasonable compensation
and the sum actually paid to him in 1941 and 1942 for his 1941 services.
5.
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The court held that the officer was not taxable in 1942 on that portion of
the compensation which, prior to the close of the taxable year, he agreed to return
to the corporation.
6.

Sale of Business-Goodwill

A troublesome problem in the sale of a going business is the tax implications of gain resulting from the transfer of its goodwill.
A sale of a going business involves the transfer of its several component
parts, some of which are capital assets under Code Sec. 117 (a) (1), the gain
from whose sale is treated as capital gains; others, such as property held for
sale to customers in the ordinary course of trade or business, are not capital assets and any profit realized on their sale is treated as ordinary income. Goodwill
is considered a capital asset. In preparing the intruments of sale, care must be
taken, however, to clearly identify each element transferred and to allocate part
of the total price paid for each; otherwise, the courts may refuse to recognize
that any part of the price was attributable to the sale of goodwill. This is illustrated in two recent cases.
(CCA-9, 1949),
F. (2d) In Grace Bros., Inc. v. Commissioner, aff'g. 10 TC 158 (1948), the taxpayer sold its entire stock of wine, barrels,
labels and list of customers. It did not sell its plaftt but instead leased it to the
buyer. The Tax Court determined the entire gain to be ordinary income because
the transaction was merely a purchase of stock-in-trade and other assets and did not
constitute, a transfer of the goodwill of the business. It stressed the fact that from
the agreement of sale it did not appear that the business was transferred as a
"unitary whole". The Ninth Circuit in affirming the Tax Court's decision noted
that the written instruments relating to the sale nowhere mentioned the element
of goodwill.
In Violet Newton, 12 TC-No. 30 (1949), the same question was considered with similar result. In that case, the taxpayer sold a pinball machine distributing business. The agreement of sale recited the assets sold as consisting of inventory, accounts receivable, credit deposits, goodwill and the right to use the firm
name. No allocation in the selling price had been made for the tangible and intangible assets sold. The taxpayers urged that the entire gain resulted from the
sale of intanglibles such as goodwill, location, etc. The Tax Court held that insufficient evidence was presented to establish a selling price for goodwill.
In the light of these cases it would seem prudent that in the sale of a going
business, the capital assets should be specifically referred to and the part of the
price allocable to such assets set forth.
7.

Entity Theory of Partnerships
Conflict exists in the law with respect to whether a partnership should be
regarded merely as an association of individuals who are co-owners of the partner-
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ship property, or as a separate legal entity distinct from the partners who compose
it. Each status involves important tax consequences. Generally, the Tax Court has
favored the entity theory and has held that a sale by a partner of his partnership
interest results in capital gain, irrespective of the nature of the assets owned by
the partnership. Commissioner v. Lehman, 7 TC 1088 (1946), aff'd. 165 F.
(2d) 383 (CCA-2, 1948), cert. den. 334 U. S. 819 (1948). The Second Circuit,
in affirming this decision, also seemed to approve of the entity theory. The Fifth
Circuit adopted the same rationale in Commissioner v. Smith, F. (2d)
(CCA-5, 1949), aff'g. 10 TC 398 (1948). In a recent decision, however, the
Second Circuit apparently abandoned this theory.
In Commissioner v. Whitney, 169 F. (2d) 562 (CCA-2, 1948) cert. den.
U. S. (1948), a partnership, whose partners controlled a corporation,
sold its assets to the corporation. The assets included securities some of which
were transferred at a gain and others at a loss. The Commissioner included the
gains in the partners' net income, but denied, under Section 24 (b) of the Code,
the losses as arising from a sale between related parties. The Tax Court conceding
that the loss would have been disallowed, if the sale had been made by the individual partners, nevertheless permitted the loss on the ground that the partnership entity was not an individual within the meaning of Code section 24 (b). In
reversing the Tax Court, the Second Circuit held that the purpose of this section
of the Code was to prevent loss deductions where a taxpayer retained the benefits of ownership after sale; and this could not be circumvented by mere legal
technicalities.
8.

Bargain Sale to Partnership Stockholders
The entity theory of partnerships was also involved in a recent case dealing
with a bargain sale to stockholders.
Where a corporation sells its assets to stockholders at less than their market
value, the difference is deemed a taxable dividend, to the extent that the corporation has earnings and profits. Does the same rule apply where the assets are sold
to the stockholders as a partnership? This was the issue in Shunk v. Commissioner,
F. (2d) (CCA-6, 1949).
A trust taxable as a corporation sold its assets at book value to a partnership
composed in part of beneficiaries of the trust. The partnership then continued the
business. The Commissioner determined that the diffcrence between the amount
paid for the assets and their market value, including good will, was taxable as a
dividend. The Tax Court agreed (10 TC 293 (1948)). On appeal, the Sixth
Circuit reversed. It held that the sale was not to the beneficiaries but to the partnership, a separate entity which must be recognized.
The entire issue reflects the conflict between legalistic approach and the
realtistic appraisal of the economics and benefits flowing from such transactions.
The latter rationale is that which is usually employed in determining the incidence
of Federal taxation.
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9.

Family Partnerships

The Supreme Court has again decided to review the income tax implications
of a family partnership. When the Tower (327 U. S. 280 (1946)) and Lusthaus
(327 U. S. 295 (1946)) decisions were announced, many tax experts held to
the opinion that they sounded the death knell of the ordinary family partnership.
However, an impressive line of taxpayer victories followed in the Circuit and
District Courts, and to a lesser extent, in the Tax Court. The Commissioner took
cognizance of this development in appealing to the Supreme Court the Fifth Circuit Court's decision in Culbertson,Sr. v. Commissioner, 168 F. (2d) 979 (CCA-5,
1948). In his petition for certiorari, the Commissioner complained that the decision
"reflects an alarming tendency by some of the Courts of Appeal to circumvent"
the Tower and Lusthaus cases. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on December 6, 1948.
In the Culbertsoncase, a father purchased his partner's interest, and pursuant
to the dissolution agreement, formed a new partnership with his four sons. The
sons gave notes to the father for their shares, which were repaid in part out of
the profits of the business, the balance being cancelled as a gift. All four sons
entered the military service shortly after the formation of the partnership and hence
did not render any services. Thus, in effect, they contributed neither capital nor
services. Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit reversed the Tax Court and recognized
the partnership for income tax purposes. The Court held that the primary test is the
reality or bona fides of the transaction. Contributions of capital and services are
merely circumstances to be considered in determining the actuality of a family
partnership.
Sales of Real Estate
A tax problem which is difficult, because it precludes, by its very nature,
the application of definite standards is the determination of whether a person
who engages in the sale of real estate is an investor or a dealer. Where the seller
is merely an investor, the profit on such sales is taxed as a capital gain under
Code section 117. If he is a dealer, the profit on such transactions is ordinary income. The more common tests applied by the Courts are the number and frequency
of such sales and the original purpose for which the property was built or acquired.
Elgin Building Corporation, 8 TCM 114 (1949) involved this issue. There,
the taxpayer, a corporation, engaged in the building of defense housing under
Title VI of the National Housing Act. Some of the houses were constructed for
rental purposes, others were immediately sold after construction without ever having been rented. Those properties which were rented, the Court held to be capital
assets under Sec. 117 (j) of the Code and the profit'realized on their sale was
capital gain. With respect to those houses which were never rented, but were
immediately sold, the court considered the frequency and regularity of such sales
and concluded that they were constructed and held primarily for sale to customers.
Therefore, the gain on their disposition was ordinary income.
10.
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11.

Constructive Receipt

The constructive receipt doctrine has long been used by the Commissioner
as a spear to prevent tax avoidance. Recently, the First Circuit, in an important
decision written by Justice Frankfurter, specially presiding, held that the same
theory can be used as a shield by the taxpayer.
In Ross V. Commissioner, 169 F. (2d) 483 (CCA-1, 1948), the taxpayer,
in 1932, became entitled to amounts a3 salary which were earned and had been
accrued on the corporation's books for that year. Instead of withdrawing the sum
due him in that year, which he could have done, he took it in 1941. He did not
report such salary as income. The Commissioner sought to tax the amounts received as income in the year 1941. The taxpayer contended that the salaries had
been constructively received in 1932 and were taxable in that year. The Statute
of Limitations, of course, barred any deficiency for the latter year. The Commissioner took the position that the concept of constructive receipt was available to
him only to prevent tax avoidance. The Circuit Court held, however, that the doctrine is a mandatory rule of law; and the mere failure to report such income in
the year it was constructively received does not render it taxable in the subsequent year of actual receipt.
The Commissioner advanced the novel argument that the taxpayer had an election to defer the tax to 1941 and his failure to report it in 1932, constituted an
election to have it taxed in the year of receipt. The Court disagreed and held
that a choice is not binding where the taxpayer has adopted the wrong method
and where such a choice is not accompanied by fraud or misrepresentation.
12.

Deductions for Illegal Expenditures
The profits from illegal enterprises have always been includible in gross
income for tax purposes. This rule has been a powerful weapon in the hands of
the Treasury in the proscution of racketeers against whom it was difficult to produce evidence of crime. The converse of this proposition, however, is not necessarily true. The Commissioner has consistently resisted the allowance of deductions
for illegal expenditures.
The justice of this rule, however, is open to question, especially where legitimate businessmen were forced, because of economic conditions, to pay over-ceiling
prices for goods during the war and post war period. In I.T. 3724, C.B. 1945, 57,
the Internal Revenue Bureau ruled that the cost of goods in excess of the OPA
ceiling prices is not deductible.
In the recent case, Lela Sullenger, 11 TC-No. 127 (1948), the Tax Court,
however, drew a distinction between ordinary deductions and allowance for cost
of goods sold. It pointed out that under the Constitution, taxable income cannot
be determined without taking into account the cost of goods sold. The Court rejected the Commissioner's position and held the entire cost, including the amount
paid in excess of the OPA ceiling price, deductible.
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On the other hand, deductions for amounts paid in compromise of an antitrust penalty, and payments to underworld characters for services in labor union
negotiations, were disallowed in two recent decisions as being against public policy:
Universal Atlas Cement Co. v. Commissioner, 171 F. (2d) 294 (CCA-2, 1948)
cert. appl. 3/15/49; Excelsior Baking Co. v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 423 (D.
Ct. Minn., 1949).
13.

Charitable Foundations
The charitable foundation is becoming an increasingly attractive instrument
for accomplishing tax savings. This development was given added impetus by
the recent Circuit Court opinion in Commissioner v. Edward Orton, Jt. Ceramic
Foundation,F. (2d) (CCA-6, 1949), which affirmed the Tax Court's
decision. There, the decedent, who was engaged in the manufacture and sale of
pyrometric cones, provided in his will for the creation of a foundation to which
his going business was to be transferred; and that the foundation was to operate
the business and devote its income to the study and promotion of the science of ceramic engineering. From the business income, his wife was first to be paid a substantial annuity for life. The annuity amounted to about 30% of the total income
of the business over a ten year period. The Court held that the income of the business was exempt from income tax under Sec. 101 (6) of the Code; that it is not
the source of the income but its ultimate destination which determines whether
the foundation is organized exclusively for charitable purposes; that it makes no
difference that the foundation was established in the same instrument which transferred the business and created the annuity to the wife; that the annuity was a
contractual obligation which had to be discharged to make the funds available
for the scientific aims of the foundation.
14.

Taxation of Annuities
The Internal Revenue Bureau has recently amended its regulations to provide
that the 3% rule for the taxation of annuities will not apply to installment payments under endowment policies and annuity contracts, unless such payments are
true technical annuities-that is, those which are computed with reference to the
life expectancy of the annuitant according to the mortality tables. The new Bureau
ruling, T. D. 5684, effective February 13, 1949, amends Regulation 111, Sec. 29.22
(b) (2)-2. In effect, it adopts the rulc announced by the Tax Court in Thornley,
2 TC 220 (1943) as to which the Commissioner had originally filed his nonacquiescence. Under the new rule such installment payments will not be taxable until the
taxpayer has completely recovered his premium payments.
15.

Alimony
Alimony paid in the form of "installment" payments to discharge an obligation of a specificed principal sum is not deductible by the husband nor taxable to the
wife for income tax purposes, unless the payments are to be made over a period
of more than 10 years. (I.R.C. Sec. 23 (k)). On the other hand, "periodic" pay-
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ments in discharge of an alimony obligation, having no relation to a fixed principal sum, are deductible by the husband and taxable to the wife, without regard
to the 10 year requirement. These rules are rather strictly applied by the courts.
In a recent case alimony payments were set at $100.00 per month for a period
of 50 months, unless the wife sooner remarried, (Frank R. Casey, 12 TC-No. 33
(1949)). However, the decree also expressly provided that such payments were
to be regarded as "periodic" and that the wife was to pay the Federal income tax
on those amounts. The Tax Court decided that such payments were in reality "installment" payments and that the language of the divorce decree was not determinative of the incidence of Federal, income taxation.
16.

Fraud Penalties against Decedents

Until the issuance of G.C.M. 22326, C.B. 1940-2, 159, the Treasury had
taken the position that the 50% civil fraud penalty could not be asserted after
the taxpayer's death. This was based on the rationale that such penalty was in the
nature of an ex delicto claim and, in the absence of any Federal statute relating to
its survival, would abate with the death of the tort-feasor. G.C.M. 22326 completely reversed the Treasury's rule. Drawing from dicta of the Supreme Court in Heivering v. Mitchell, 303 U. S. 391 (1938), the G.C.M. declared that civil fraud penalties are not penalties because they involve no element of personal punishment, but
are rather remedial in nature and intended to reimburse the government for loss resulting from taxapayer's fraud and expense of investigation.
The first judicial decision to rule squarely on this point since G.C.M. 22326,
recently came from the Tax Court. In Estate of Louis L. Briden, 11 TC-No.
131 (1948), the decedent's estate was held liable f6r the 50% fraud penalty
under Section 293 (b) of the Code, despite the fact that notice of deficiency assessment was not issued until after decedent's death.
ESTATE TAX
III.
a. 1948 Revenue Act
The amendments made to the Federal estate tax statute by the Revenue Act
of 1948 represent the most recent effort of Congress to bring about an equality
in the burden of such taxes between the estates of decedents who resided in
community property states and those of common law states. The development
of this process of equalization presents an interesting narrative.
In community property states, each spouse owns a half-interest in the community property. Generally, such property consists of earnings and property acquired by either spouse during coverture, irrespective of which spouse holds title.
Prior to 1942, upon the death of a spouse, only his one-half interest in such property, which he had the right to dispose of by will, was subject to Federal estate
tax. The other one-half, being the property of the surviving spouse under the law
of community property states, did not form part of the estate of the deceased
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spouse; and was not subject to tax until the death of the surviving spouse. On the
other hand, in common law states, neither spouse had an undivided interest in
the property of the other during the lifetime of both. Upon the death of the
spouse owning the property, or the death of the earning spouse where the property was jointly owned by both spouses, the entire amount thereof was subject
to Federal estate tax.
Since the estate tax is imposed at sharply progressive rates which increase
in the respective brackets as the size of the estate mounts, the result was that substantially lower estate taxes were assessed against the estates of decedents in community property states than were assessed on estates of similar size in common
law states.
The Congress in 1942, by amendment of the Federal estate tax law, attempted to eliminate this discrimination against the estates of decedents who died residents of common law states.
The amendments of that year provided that the entire community property
should be included in the decedent's gross estate, except such portion as could be
shown to have been received as compensation for personal services actually rendered by the surviving spouse, or derived originally from such compensation, or from
separate property of the surviving spouse. Thus, as in common law states, the entire community property was taxable to the first spouse to die unless some portion of the community was economically attributable to the surviving spouse. A
further provision stated that there should be at least included in the estate of the
decedent so much of the property over which such deceased spouse had a power
of disposition at death.
The 1948 Revenue Act repealed the community property provisions inserted
in 1942 and restored the taxability of community property to its pre-1942 status.
It created, also, the marital deduction for estates of decedents who resided in
common law states. However, the pattern for the includibility of property in the
decedent's gross estate is not disturbed. The same types of property which formed part of the decedent's gross estate for Federal estate tax purposes prior to the
1948 Revenue Act continue to be subject to the tax on and after January 1, 1948,
as of which date the new Estate Tax amendments became effective.
An additional deduction was added to the Estate Tax statute by a new section of the Code known as Sec. 812 (e). Under it, a decendent-spouse is allowed
a marital deduction from his gross estate in an amount equal to the value of all
interests passing from the decedent to the surviving spouse under certain conditions. The deduction, however, is limited to an amount not in excess of 50%
of the decedent's adjusted gross estate. Community property is generally not available for the marital deduction and is given special treatment.
To qualify for the marital deduction, the interest in property passing to the
surviving spouse must either pass outright or by means of a trust. If it passes in
trust, the following conditions must be met:
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1.-The surviving spouse must be entitled for life to all the trust income
which must be distributed annually or at more frequent intervals. Thus, trusts
under which the income is to be accumulated, or may in the discretion of the
trustee be accumulated and not distributed, will not qualify for the marital deduction.
2.-The surviving spouse must have the power, either during life or at
death, or both, to appoint the entire corpus free of the trust to herself or in favor
of her estate.
3.-The surviving spouse must have the right to exercise this power alone
and in all events.
4.-If any person other than the surviving spouse has the power to appoint
any part of the trust corpus, such power must be exercisable only in favor of
the surviving spouse.
The 1948 Revenue Act failed to deal adequately with the peculiar problems
which life insurance presented. Congress soon thereafter, on July 1, 1949, adopted a Joint Resolution amending Sec. 812 (c) (1) (G) of the Code relating to
life insurance with power of appointment in the surviving spouse.
This Resolution provided that where the proceeds under a life insurance,
endowment or annuity contract, are held by the insurer and made payable to the
surviving spouse in installments, or where such proceeds are held by the insurer
subject to an agreement to pay interest thereon to the surviving spouse, such
proceeds will qualify for purposes of the marital deduction, if the following
conditions are met:
1.-The installments or interest payments must be payable annually or at more
frequent intervals commencing not later than 13 months after the decedent's death.
2.-All amounts payable during the life of the surviving spouse must be
payable only to such spouse.
3.-The surviving spouse must have the power to appoint all amounts payable either to herself during her lifetime or to her estate, or both.
4.-This power of appointment must be exercisable by the surviving spouse
alone and in all events.
The extent to which the marital deduction should be employed will largely
depend upon a comparison of the estates of both spouses. It should be remembered
that to the extent that a surviving spouse receives property from a deceased, taxfree, by virtue of the marital deduction, it will be taxable in her estate if she
still owns it at the time of her subsequent death.
The Treasury Department on May 18th, 1949 issued estate and gift tax
regulations to implement the changes made by the 1948 Revenue Act. Generally
speaking, these regulations are liberal. Thus, with respect to the question of the
type of trusts which will qualify for the marital deduction, the regulations pro-
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vide that the trustee may be given all the usual powers necessary for administering the trust; and provided, further, that they do not operate to deprive the surviving spouse of the beneficial enjoyment during life, which the principles of
the law of trusts accord to such a beneficiary. Spendthrift provisions are permissible and the income can even be accumulated, so long as it is subject to the wife's
power to request distribution annually.
b. Supreme Court Decisions
1. Pre-1931 Trusts with Income Retained
The recent Supreme Court decisions on Federal Estate Tax have indeed been
significant and precedent-shattering. In Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U.
S. 632 (1949), the Court overruled its own decision in May v. Heiner, 281 U. S.
238 (1930).
In May v. Heiner, supra, the Supreme Court held that a transfer, in which
the decedent reserved the income for life, was not taxable as a transfer intended
to take effect in possession or enjoyment at death under Sec. 302 (c) of the Revenue Act of 1926-now Sec. 811 (c) of the I.R.C. As a result of this decision,
Congress enacted the now famous Joint Resolution of March 3, 1931, amending
the relevant section of the statute to specifically include such property. Subsequently, in Hassett v. Welch, 303 U. S. 303 (1938), the Supreme Court decided
that the amendments made by the Joint Resolution could not be applied to transfers made before March 3, 1931, even though the transferor died after that date.
The rules of May v. Heiner and Hassett v. Welch became firmly imbedded
in Federal Estate tax law and were recognized in the Commissioner's own regulations. In fact, the Commissioner, in appealing the Church case, supra, to the
Supreme Court, raised only the question whether the possibility of reverter present
in the case was sufficient to cause the transfer to be includible in the estate of
the decedent. He did not contend that the pre-1931 transfer was taxable because
of the retention of income.
The Supreme Court, however, took advantage of this opportunity to state,
in the Church Estate opinion, that in the light of its decision in Helvering v.
Hallock, 309 U. S. 106 (1940), May v. Heiner, supra, was no longer correct;
and held further that pre-March 3, 1931 transfers with income retained are includible in the estate of the transferor for Federal estate tax purposes.
The Commissioner has now proposed amendments to the Estate Tax Regulations to conform to the change in the law made by the Church Estate decision.
The proposed regulations state that the rule announced in the Church Estate case
will not be applied retroactively, with respect to decedents who died on or before
January 17, 1949, the date of the Supreme Court's decision.
2. Possibility of Reverter by Operation of Law
On the same day, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Estate of
Spiegel v. Commissioner, 335 U. S. 701 (1949), a companion case to Commis-
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sioner v. Estate of Church, supra. The Court sought to resolve unequivocally all
the troublesome questions of the' estate tax implications of the remote possibility
of reverter by operation of law.
In Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106 (1940), the Supreme Court held
that a transfer in trust, with the express proviso that the corpus should revert
to the grantor in the event he survived the beneficiaries, was includible in the
grantor's gross estate at death under the "possession or enjoyment" provision of
Sec. 811 (c) of the Code.
Since that decision, the Commissioner has repeatedly sought to extend the
Hallock doctrine to include reverters arising, not only by the express language
of the trust instrument, but also those which could come into eixstence only by
operation of law. The decisions of the lower courts on this issue were hopelessly
in conflict.
The Spiegel case resolved this conflict by holding that all reverters, whether
express or by operation of law and irrespective of remoteness, would cause the
transfer to be includible in the gross estate under Sec. 811 (c) of the Code.
The Spiegel case demonstrates how remote a possibility of reverter by operation of law can be and yet result in the taxability of the entire trust corpus.
There, the decedent transferred property in trust, with the income payable to
his three children during his lifetime, or, if they did not survive him, to their
surviving children. The corpus was distributable in the same manner. No specific
provision was made in the event the decedent outlived his children and grandchildren. Actually, the grantor was survived by his three children and grandchildren.
Under local law, the trust corpus would have reverted to the grantor, had he
survived his children and their issue.
It is interesting to note, as one of the dissenting opinions points out, the
court's decision sustained a tax of $450,000.00 because of a remote possibility of
reverter which had an actuarial value of $70.00 at the time of the grantor's death.
On April 15, 1949, the Treasury issued proposed amendments in its Estate
Tax Regulations to conform with the Church and Spiegel decisions. They provide
that a right to the possession or enjoyment of the property or a right to the income
therefrom constitutes a right or interest in the property. This provision reconciles
the Regulations with the Church decision.
Another proposed change is in one of the examples under Section 81.17 of
the Regulations. An entirely new example is substituted for example 6, which
indicates that if the decedent has parted with every right and interest in the property, no part of the property will be includible in the decedent's gross estate.
The effect of the Spiegel case is to be seen in Estate of Mverritt ]. Corbett,
12 TC-No. 22 (1949). There, the decedent created a trust with the income payable to his wife so long as she remained married to him, and upon his death, the
income was to continue to be paid to her for the remainder of her life. In the
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event she ceased to be his wife, the income was to be paid to him. Certain remainder
interests were also created over which the decedent retained the right to change
beneficiaries. There was no doubt that the remainder interests were includible.
The question was whether the value of the wife's life estate was also includible.
The Tax Court, relying on the rationale of the Spiegel case, held that it was; that
the wife's life estate depended on the contingency of her surviving the decedent
and the contingency ended only with the decedent's death. Therefore, the life
interest did not fully vest in the wife until that time.
Some attempts to circumvent the effect of the Spiegel decision have already
been made. Thus, Minnesota enacted a law (Ch. 201 Minn. Laws of 1949) to
the effect that no reversionary interest is to be deemed to exist, if the settlor
has manifested an intention to divest himself of all interest in the trust. Instead,
the trust fund is to be held upon a resulting trust for the benefit of the state. if all
the beneficiaries predecease him.
In Pennsylvania, the grantor of a trust which did not provide for the disposition of the fund in the event he survived all the beneficiaries, petitioned the court
to reform the trust deed, asserting that this contingency was not covered, through
the inadvertence and mistake of the draftsman, and stating that he now wished
to provide that in such event the income should pass to a charity. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court returned the case to the lower court for further evidence
with instructions that if the lower court finds that the omission was in fact a mistake or inadvertence, the court may permit the requested reformation. Irish v. Irish,
361 Pa. 410 (1949). The final outcome is not yet known.
3. Charitable Remainders as a Deduction
In another estate tax case, the Supreme Court strongly reaffirmed its own
prior decision in Merchants National Bank of Boston v. Commissioner, 320 U. S.
256 (1943), with respect to deductions for charitable remainders.
Where a remainder interest is given to a charity, its actuarial value is allowed
as a deduction for Federal estate tax purposes. The difficulty arises where invasion
of the trust corpus is permitted for the benefit of the life tenant. The courts have
held that if the power to invade the corpus can be measured by a clearly defined
standard contained in the instrument, the charitable deduction for the remainder
interest will be allowed for that portion of the fund which, under all the circumstances, will definitely be devoted to charity. On the other hand, where there is
no such standard, the deduction will not be granted.
Thus, in Henslee v. Union Planters National Bank & Trust Company, 335
U. S. 600 (1949), the decedent created a trust providing for the payment of a
stipulated amount per month to his mother for life with remainder interests to
charities. The trustees were given the discretionary power to expend either incomc
or principal for the "pleasure, comfort and welfare" of the mother, and "in such
manner as she may desire". At decedent's death, the mother was 85 years of age
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with substantial independent means of her own so that the possibility of corpus
invasion was extremely remote. The Supreme Court, nevertheless, held that a
deduction for the charitable remainder could not be allowed because the power to
invade was not governed by any ascertainable standard. It also commented on the
fact that by the terms of the trust instrument, the charitable remainders were subordinated to the decedent's primary concern for his mother. That as a practical
matter, the possibility of invasion was unlikely, was immaterial.
4.

Valuation of Remainder Interests

The valuation of the assets in a decedent's gross estate for Federal estate tax
purposes is always fraught with great difficulties. A particularly complex problem
arises in valuing remainder interests left to charities. The law is that where life
estates are given to specified persons with remainders to charities, the estate is
allowed a deduction for the charitable remainder. The difficulty arises in computing
the value of the remainder interest where indeterminate factors are present. One
of these factors-the power to invade the corpus for the benefit of the life tenantwas previously discussed in connection with the Supreme Court decision in the
Union Planters .Nationai Bank & Trust Company case, supra. Another factorthe role of life expectancy tables-is highlighted in two recent Tax Court decisions.
In Estate of Nellie H. Jennings, 10 TC 323 (1948), the decedent bequeathed
her estate in trust to pay the income to her husband for life with remainder to a
designated charity. The husband was 73 years of age at his wife's death. He had
been extremely ill the past several years and it was apparent that he would not
live as long as the life expectancy table predicted for a man of his age. As a matter
of fact, he died within two months. The Commissioner, nevertheless, computed
the husband's life interest by reference to the ordinary life expectancy tables. The
Court held, however, that actual physical conditions, not life expectancy tables,
controlled valuation.
In Estate of Reinhold H. Forstmann, 6 TCM 136 (1947), the decedent provided that the income from a trust be paid to his wife for life unless she remarried,
remainder to charity. The Court held that the valuation of the wife's life estate
should be based on the American Experience Tables designed to reflect the possibilities of a woman at that age remarrying.
c. Lower Court Decisions
Estate Tax Implications of Deferred Compensation Arrangements
The use of deferred compensation arrangements has increased substantially
in recent years. Recently, there have been several important decisions dealing with
the estate tax implications of such arrangements upon the death of the employee.
In Estate of William L. Nevin, 11 TC 59 (1948) (acq.), the decedent was
the president of John Wanamaker Philadelphia. To persuade him to resign, the
corporation entered into a formal contract with him whereby it agreed to pay him
1.
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a stipulated pension for a period of ten years. If he died within ten years, the
remaining payments were to be made to his widow, if she survived him. The
Tax Court held that upon his death, the value of the remaining payments to be
made to his widow was includible in his gross estate under Sec. 811 (c) of the
Code. The rationale of the court's decision was that the payments were made
under an enforceable contract, supported by valid consideration.
The same result was reached in Estate of Paul G. Leoni, 7 TCM 759 (1948).
In Estate of William 1. Higgs, 12 TC-No. 43 (1949), the decedent under
a retirement pension fund paid for by the employer had the right to elect, prior to
retirement, to receive either an annuity for his own life or a smaller survivorship
annuity for the lives of himself and his wife. He chose the latter. At his death,
the Court held that the value of the widow's survivorship rights were includible
in his gross estate under Sec. 811 (c).
A dissenting opinion contended that no "transfer" had been made by the
decedent, since he exercised his option prior to the time the annuity had vested in
him.
On the other hand, where a company voluntarily paid a substantial bonus
to an estate of a deceased employee in recognition of his long and faithful services,
the Court held that the bonus was not includible in the employee's gross estate,
since it was not paid pursuant to any contract. lack Messing, 7 TCM 568 (1948).
Similarly, Estate of Eugene F. Saxton, 12 TC-No. 74 (1949).
In Estate of Emil A. Stake, 11 TC-No. 98 (1948), the decedent employee
contributed to an employee's pension fund to which his employer also contributed.
He died prior to retirement age (60 years). Under the plan, the employer could
either pay a pension to his widow or repay his contributions with interest. The
employer elected to pay the pension. The Court held that only the value of the
employee's contributions with interest was includible in his gross estate because
the decedent, prior to reaching retirement age, had at most an expectancy of a
pension for his widow and not a vested right thereto. He had definite rights only
to repayment of his contributions with interest.
The rule would appear to be that if the payments to the widow are made
pursuant to a contractual obligation, their value will be includible in the decedent's
gross estate. On the other hand, if the payments are made voluntarily by the employer, their value will not form part of the decedent's estate.
2.

Contemplation of Death

A decedent's age at the time he makes a transfer is of great importance in
determining whether the transfer was made in contemplation of death. The factor
of advanced years may, however, be overcome by evidence of motives associated
with life. In Estate of Oliver Johnson, 10 TC 680 (1948), the decedent died at
the age of 90. Four years earlier, he had made a substantial transfer of his property.
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The Court held that despite his advanced age, the gift was not in contemplation
of death. It found that his primary motive was to rid himself of the management
of certain properties.
Grantor's Retained Power to Accumulate or Distribute Income
A power either to accumulate or distribute the current income of a trust has
been held to be a power of alteration or amendment which would cause the trust
to be includible in the grantor's gross estate at death under Sec. 811 (d) of the
Code. This is so because the decedent in exercising such a power could favor the
remaindermen as against the life tenants. The cases have held, however, that
only the interest of the life tenant which could thereby be affected was includible.
A recent decision seems to reveal a tendency to include the entire trust, pursuant
to the philosophy of the decision in Estate of Speigel v. Commissioner, 335 U. S.
3.

651 (1949).
(CCA-3, 1949),
F. (2d) In Commissioner v. Estate of Hager, the decedent had retained the power to accumulate or distribute income; and also
the power to treat capital gains resulting from the sale of trust assets either as
part of income, in which event they would benefit the life tenants, or as corpus,
which would inure to the advantage of the remaindermen. The Court considered
these powers to be powers of alteration and amendment and held that the entire
trust, not only the life tenant's interest, was includible in the decedent's gross estate
under Sec. 811 (d).
Power Retained to Remove Trustee as Power to Terminate
In another recent decision involving Section 811 (d), the decedent created
a trust reserving to the trustee the power to terminate the trust. The decedent, as
donor, retained the power to remove the trustee and appoint himself successortrustee. Thus, he would be in a position to exercise the power of termination. The
Court held, in Estate of Paul Lougbbridge, 11 TC-No. 115 (1948), that the trust
was includible in the decedent's gross estate, even though the decedent never
became the trustee, so that the power to terminate was not vested in him at
the time of his death.
4.

IV.
a.

GIFT TAX

1948 Revenue Ac

Prior to the Revenue Act of 1942, residents of community property states
enjoyed a distinct Federal gift tax advantage over residents in common law
states in respect of the transfer of property by gift.
A gift of community property was taxable as though one-half of the value
of the gift were the gift of the husband and one-half the gift of the wife. In
common law states, neither spouse had an undivided interest in the property of
the other. Therefore, the entire value of the property was taxable as the gift of
the donor spouse.
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By the Revenue Act of 1942, Congress attempted to equalize this gift tax
burden between residents of community property and common law states. It
amended the gift tax law with respect to community property by providing that
all gifts of community property were to be considered as the gifts of the husband,
except gifts of such property which could be shown to have been received as
compensation for personal services actually rendered by the wife, or derived from
such compensation originally, or from separate property of the wife which were
to be considered as gifts of the wife.
The 1948 Revenue Act repealed Sec. 1000 (d) of the Internal Revenue Code
relating to gifts of property held as community property except as to gifts made
between January 1, 1943, and April 2, 1948, the date of the enactment of the
1948 Revenue Act.
The repeal of the gift tax provisions in respect of community property,
restored the pre-1942 gift tax status of such gifts. At the same time, the Congress
introduced "gift tax splitting" between spouses resident in common law states,
which is similar in its effect to the pattern used for income taxes.
Section 372 of the 1948 Revenue Act amended section 1004 (a) of the Code
by adding a new paragraph known as (3) entitled "Gift to Spouse". As in the
case of the Federal estate tax, there was introduced into the Federal tax system,
for the first time in its history, a marital deduction in computing the net gifts of
citizens and residents of the United States. The marital deduction for gift tax purposes is allowed for gifts made after April 2, 1948, the date of the enactment of
the 1948 Revenue Act. Gifts of community property, however, are given special
treatment.
Under the new law, the marital deduction is an amount equal to one-half the
value of any gift of an interest in property made to a donee who, at the time of the
gift, is the donor's spouse. It is to be determined with respect to each gift to a
spouse without regard to the annual exclusion. Thus, if a donor makes a gift to
his spouse of $10,000.00, there will be allowed an annual exclusion of $3,000.00
and a marital deduction of $5,000.00 (one-half of $10,000.00). The net gift will
be only $2,000.00.
The marital deduction is allowed for absolute gifts of property. It is, however, disallowed with respect to terminable interests.
The marital deduction may be applied towards an interest transferred in trust
by a donor spouse provided that requirements, similar to those set forth in the
estate tax amendments, are complied with.
Furthermore, a new subsection (f) was added to section 1000 of the Code by
section 374 of the 1948 Revenue Act. A gift made after April 2, 1948, the date
of the enactment of the 1948 Revenue Act, by one spouse to any other person than
his spouse will be considered as made one-half by him and one-half by his spouse.
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The splitting of gifts made by either spouse to third parties is not mandatory.
It is permitted only if both spouses consent. A consent signified with respect to
any gift made during the calendar year will apply with equal force to all gifts made
to third parties during such calendar year; and will apply to property held by the
spouses as joint tenants or as tenants by the entireties.
The effect of the marital deduction, under the amendments to the gift tax
statute made by the Revenue Act of 1948, is to make possible the transfer by gift
between spouses of double the amount of property which could have been so
transferred to such spouse free of gift tax prior to the enactment of the new law;
and in the case of gifts by husband or wife to a third party to increase the amount
of gifts which can be made free of gift tax by virtue of the additional exclusion
and the additional specific exemption which will inure in favor of the spouse of
the donor.
Amendment to the Gift Tax Regulations reflecting the changes made by the
1948 Revenue Act were published in the Federal Register on May 18, 1949.
b. Court Decisions
Two cases, recently decided, are of interest with respect to the allowance of
the annual gift tax exclusion. Since January 1, 1943, a donor is permitted a
$3,000.00 annual exclusion for gifts made to each donee. Prior to 1943, the
amount allowed was larger. The exclusion, however, does not apply to gifts of
future interests. With respect to gifts in trust, the annual exclusion is usually allowed to the extent of the present value of the income beneficiary's right to the
income of the trust.
In Jesse S. Phillips, 12 TC-No. 32 (1949), the petitioner transferred a. life
insurance policy in trust, with the direction to pay the net income therefrom to his
wife during her life; and if the income was inadequate for her proper support and
maintenance, to pay to her so much of the principal as might be necessary for such
purpose. The Court held that the annual exclusion could not be applied because
the insurance trust was non-income producing. Moreover, no exclusion results from
the provision permitting the, cash value of the policy to be paid to the beneficiary
since such invasion is based upon a contingency which had not occurred at the
time of the gift.
(CCA-8, 1949), the beneF. (2d) In Kniep v. Commissioner, ficiaries of a trust were to receive the annual income. In addition, the trustees
were authorized to pay each beneficiary up to $1,000.00 if necessary for maintenance and support. For purposes of the annual exclusion, the Circuit Court based
the value of the present right to receive the income on the commuted value of the
income from the trust principal, reduced each year by $1,000.00. It was considered
immaterial that the trustees might never dip into the principal to that extent.
As in the Pbillips decision, supra, the Court refused to consider the right to
invade the corpus as a gift of a present interest.

CURRENT TAX DEVELOPMENTS

These decisions apply only to the annual exclusion. The $30,000.00 specific
exemption is available for all gifts, irrespective of whether the gift is of a present
or future interest.
1.

Transfers Incident to Divorce

That the Commissioner's rulings arc not sacrosanct was again illustrated in
the case of Edward B. McLean, 11 TC 543 (1948) (non-acq.) (appealed to
CCA-2 1/4/49). Internal Revenue Bureau's ruling ET 19, 1946-2 CB 166, provides that transfers of property, pursuant to an agreement incident to divorce, are
not for an adequate and full consideration to the extent that they are made in consideration of the release of marital rights other than right of maintenance and
support; and hence are to be considered taxable gifts, under Code Section 1002.
In the McLean case, rupra the taxpayer and his wife, after protracted negotiations while a divorce action was pending, entered into a separation agreement
whereby the taxpayer undertook to pay specified monthly amounts to his wife and
to make lesser payments to her in the event of her remarriage. The Commissioner
contended, in the light of ET 19, 1946-2 CB 166, that the payments to be made
to the wife after her re-marriage constituted gifts. The Court held otherwise and
rejected the Bureau's ruling. The Court could find no donative intent since the
agreed payments to be made to the wife both before and after marriage were the
result of bargaining which had as its sole objective the securing of the most
advantageous terms.
V.

LOOKING AHEAD

The impact of Federal taxation on the economic life of the nation in recent
years has been tremendous. It has become one of the most important factors affecting the business and social life of the American community. The year 1949 opened
with a request by President Truman to the Congress for an increase in Federal
taxation to stem the tide of threatened inflation. The continued downward economic course in business since then and the assumption of additional financial
responsibilities by the nation has halted this inflationary trend. At the same time,
a deficit in the Federal budget of approximately four billion dollars is indicated.
The solution to this problem poses the following alternativcs-either to increase
taxes to meet the deficit or to reduce the budgetary requirements by the necessary
amount. Each approach has its advocates. The President stands firm in his demand
that Congress increase taxes. A considerable body of responsible leadership prefers
to reduce the budget and wishes to avert the increase in taxation, being of the
opinion that it might defeat its own purpose by converting the current deflationary
trend into a sharp recession.
All indications now point to the fact that there might not be time at
this session of the Congress to consider a new revenue bill; but that it will.probably
become an early order of business at the next session.

DICKINSON LAW' REVIEV

The Treasury is considering the inclusion of the following items in the new
bill:
1. Credit for dividends received by a parent corporation from a foreign
subsidiary.
2. Where a corporation receives a dividend in kind, the credit should be
limited to 85% of the adjusted basis of the property in the hands of the distributing corporation.
3. A provision different from the present 3% rule on annuities. The
Treasury recommends the allowance of an annual exclusion equal to the consideration paid for the annuity divided by the life expectancy of the annuitant at the time
the payments commence, This exclusion would be allowable for life.
4. The treatment of a partnership distribution to heirs of a deceased partner
as income of the decedent, so there will be no over-lapping of income and estate
tax.
5. Relaxation of the involuntary conversion provision to allow replacement
of the destroyed property prior to receipt of insurance proceeds; and also easing
the restrictions concerning the tracing of the proceeds.
6. Some provision which will prevent manipulation of long and short
positions in substantially identical securities.
7. A general revamping of the provisions relating to the taxability of income
of estates and trusts.
8. A change in the provisions dealing with corporate liquidations to eliminate problems resulting from the Court Holding Company case.
9. The provision in HR 6712 of the 80th Congress relating to stock options
is still being considered. The Treasury does not favor it.
10. Other situations which might be treated are mortgage foreclosures, the
capital gains structure and net operating losses.

